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ARGUMENT
Issue No. 1
The Court Should Apply the Correction of Error
Standard of Review.
Defendant Energy Mutual Insurance Company asserts that
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Industrial Commission
found a lack of medical causation between Ms. Cox's industrial
injuries and her permanent total disability.

Based upon this

assertion, Energy Mutual concludes that the "substantial evidence"
standard of review should be applied by this court.

(Defendant's

Brief at 3). Energy Mutual relies upon such a finding of lack of
medical causation in asserting that Ms. Cox is not entitled to
benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine.
Defendant is incorrect. Both the ALJ's Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law and Order and the Industrial Commission's Order
Denying Motion for Review contain findings of at least minimal
medical causation between Ms. Cox's industrial accidents and her
permanent total disability.

The ALJ accepted the medical panel

report containing findings of medical causation as her own, and the
parties have not challenged those findings. Therefore, the issue
is whether the ALJ and Industrial Commission correctly applied its
findings to the applicable law.

The standard of review in such

circumstances is the correction of error standard of review without
deference to the decision of the administrative agency.
2

On November 3, 1992, Ms. Cox was referred to a medical
panel for evaluation, which issued its report on November 27, 1992.
The ALJ adopted the medical panel report to resolve all issues of
causation and impairment.

(R. 80).

The medical panel found Ms.

Cox to be suffering from a 36% whole person permanent impairment.
(R. 78). Of Ms. Cox's 36% whole person impairment, 2.83% was
attributed to the industrial injury she suffered on August 15,
1988.
injury

Id.

An additional 1.27% was attributed to the industrial

she

suffered

in

December,

1987.

Id.

The

remaining

percentage of Ms. Cox's whole person impairment stems from her
preexisting condition.

Id.

Nothing has contributed to Ms. Cox's

whole person impairment rating since the industrial accident on
August 15, 1988.

Id.

On December 21, 1992, Ms. Cox was declared

by Social Security to be disabled.

(R. 51-57, 65). The ALJ found

that Ms. Cox is "probably totally disabled."
Petitioner

is mindful

(R. 85).

of the distinction

between an

applicant's disability and impairment. However, it defies logic to
recognize that on the one hand, industrial accidents have medically
contributed to a person's overall impairment rating and that the
impairment has caused permanent total disability, but on the other
hand,

to

then

assert

that

the

industrial

contribute to the permanent total disability.

3

accidents

did

not

The conclusion that the impairments stemming from the
industrial accidents medically contributed to Ms. Cox's overall
disability is supported by the comments of both the ALJ and the
Industrial Commission. For example, the ALJ found that the August
15, 1988 injury contributed to the applicant's overall disability,
albeit "only minimally."

(R. at 82).

Likewise the ALJ found that

"some of the applicant's medical care providers have pointed to the
applicant's back and neck problems and her loss of her job as
causes of her current disability."

(R. 80). The ALJ discounted

that finding, however, because the industrial injuries were not
"the sole cause of her back and neck problems and the loss of her
job."

Id.

(emphasis added).
Likewise the Industrial Commission recognized that there

was a causal relationship between the industrial accidents and Ms.
Cox's overall whole person impairment, and between her whole person
impairment and the disability:
The medical panel assigned 95% of the
applicant's 14% lower impairment and 80% of
the applicant's 17% cervical spine impairment
to the applicant's balloon chasing accident
and other pre-existing impairments.
The
relatively small proportion of the applicant's
impairment that was attributed
to the
industrial accident of August 15, 1988, is, in
our view, insufficient to support a finding
that
the
applicant's
permanent
total

4

disability
accident.

was

caused

by

that

industrial

(R. 122).x
While both the ALJ and the Industrial Commission found
medical

causation

between

the

industrial

accidents

and

the

impairments that led to permanent total disability, both applied
either a significant cause legal standard or an exclusive cause
legal standard, neither of which is the correct legal standard to
apply.

The application of erroneous legal standards led to the

denial of benefits.
Hence the standard of review by this court should be the
correction of error without deference to the decision of the
administrative agency, as this case hinges on the application of
facts to law or interpretation of law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4);

Willardson

v.

App. June 28, 1993).

Industrial
King

v.

Commission,
Industrial

1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993); Luckau
P.2d 811 (Utah App. 1992); Morton

Division,

v.

216 U.A.R. 12 (Utah

Com'n of
Industrial

International,

Utah,

850 P.2d

Commission,
Inc.

v.

840
Auditing

814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

1

Even the defendant apparently concedes medical causation
when it points out that there "are medical opinions that said
accident contributed to Applicant's overall disability." (R. 106) .
5

Issue No. 2
The Correct Standard for Medical Causation is the
Medically Demonstrable Causal Link Standard
As discussed above and in Ms. Cox's original brief, the
ALJ and Industrial Commission applied "significant cause"

or

"exclusive cause" standards of medical causation. The application
of those standards was prejudicial error. Most recently this court
opined in Abel

v.

Industrial

Commission,

221 Utah Adv. 15 (Utah

App. Sept. 3f 1993), "By focusing on the significant

cause of

Abel's disability ... the Board applied an incorrect standard, and
such ruling cannot stand."

Id.

The Abel case is remarkably similar to the present case.
Like Ms. Cox, the applicant suffered an industrial back injury.
The applicant also suffered from many other significant ailments
which contributed much more heavily to the disability than the
minimal

impairments

attributable

to the

industrial accident.

Similar to Ms. Cox, the impairment attributable to the industrial
accident only accounted for five percent of the applicant's whole
person impairment. Id.

Based upon these facts, the ALJ concluded

that the industrial accident did not medically cause the permanent
total disability.

Id.

The Industrial Commission affirmed the

6

ALJ's finding, stating that the "industrial accident was not a
significant cause of his permanent disability."

Id.

at 16.2

The court reversed the Industrial Commission, stating
that the appropriate standard for finding medical causation is not
Id.

a significant cause standard.

The court was explicit in

holding that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988) does not require the
ALJ or the Industrial Commission to find the industrial injury to
be a significant cause of the disability.

In pre-1990 claims for

industrial accidents, it is reversible error for the ALJ or
Industrial Commission to impose a quantitative element in the
causation analysis.

Id.

The courts holding is consistent with

and reaffirms the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Allen
Industrial

v.

Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), where the court held

that the applicant must only show "a medically demonstrable causal
link between the work-related exertions and the unexpected injuries
that resulted from those strains."

2

Id.

(emphasis added).

The Industrial
Commission based its decision
upon Utah
Admin. Code R490-1-17(C) (1991) which adds a quantitative
requirement of a "significant cause of the disability." This rule
was promulgated in 1990 while the applicant's industrial injury
occurred in 1989, hence the court held that it had no application
to his claim. Id.
The court's holding clearly demonstrates that
the rule, or its substantive implications, can have no retroactive
application to this case.
Ms. Cox suffered her industrial
accidents in December 1987, and on August 15, 1988. (R. 69-70).
Therefore Ms. Cox need not show any quantitative causation.
7

Though the impairments caused by Ms. Cox's industrial
accidents constitute only a small portion of Ms. Cox's overall
impairment, and Ms. Cox's whole person impairment is one of many
factors contributing to her disability, there is a medically
demonstrable

link

disability.

Application of the correct causation standards as

found in Allen

between

and Abel

the

industrial

accidents

and

her

dictate that Ms. Cox should receive

benefits for her permanent total disability.
Issue No. 3
The Applicant is Entitled to Permanent and Total Disability
Under the "Odd-Lot" Doctrine.
Permanent total disability benefits should be granted
"[w]hen a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an
industrial accident is combined with other factors to render the
claimant unable to obtain employment."
Comm'n of

Utah,

Zimmerman v.

Industrial

785 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis

added). Because Ms. Cox has demonstrated medical causation, she is
entitled
Industrial

to benefits under the odd-lot doctrine.
Commission,

Zupon

v.

221 U.A.R. 37, 38 (Utah App., September 14,

1993) .
Likewise, plaintiff has demonstrated that she cannot be
rehabilitated.

The

evidence

is

uncontroverted

that

Delvin

McFarlane, LCSW, upon evaluating Ms. Cox, determined on March 30,
1992 that there was no way that Ms. Cox could return to work and
8

that she should receive a speedy disability retirement.
A

(R. 76).

functional capacity evaluation of Ms. Cox at Carbon Emery

Physical Therapy/Alta Health Services determined that she could
only participate in light/sedentary work. Id.

Ms. Cox has met the

burden of showing that she cannot be rehabilitated. The burden was
upon defendant to demonstrate otherwise.

Zupon,

221 UAR 37, 38.

It has not met this burden, thus benefits should be awarded.
It is disingenuous for defendant to argue that benefits
are not warranted due to the failure to refer to the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation.

First, it was the ALJ's erroneous

application of the wrong legal standard that precluded a tentative
finding of permanent total disability which would have triggered
such a referral. Applicant cannot be denied relief because of the
very error from which she has appealed.
Second, a referral to the Division would be a meaningless
act which the law does not demand. It is clear that Ms. Cox cannot
return to her former employment. The ALJ conceded that Ms. Cox was
"probably totally disabled."

The Social Security Administration,

applying standards very much like those governing permanent total
disability in the Industrial Commission, has found her to be
totally disabled.
referral
vocational

to

the

Nothing stands to be gained by making a futile
Vocational

Rehabilitation

Division,

where

counselors have already determined Ms. Cox to be
9

disabled and essentially unemployable.

The burden now rests upon

defendant to show that the applicant is not totally disabled, which
burden defendant cannot meet.
CONCLUSION
The facts as found by the ALJ and affirmed by the
Industrial Commission establish a medically demonstrable link
between Claudia Cox's industrial injuries and her permanent, total
disability. However, neither the ALJ nor the Industrial Commission
correctly applied the proper causation standard of "a medically
demonstrable causal link."
Application of the correct standard demonstrates that Ms.
Cox qualifies for permanent total disability under the "odd-lot"
doctrine."

The industrially related impairment, coupled with non-

industrial factors, have rendered Ms. Cox disabled and entitled to
benefits.
This Court is charged with correction of errors committed
by the Industrial Commission.

The undisputed facts of this case

justify a reversal of the Industrial Commission's order denying
Cox's Motion for Review.

This Court should remand to the

10

Industrial

Commission

with

directions

to

enter

an

award

of

permanent total disability benefits to Claudia Cox.
DATED this /Otk day of December, 1993,

EDWARD B. H A V A S 7
Attorney for Applicant/Petitioner
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ADDENDUM
Determinative Statutes

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-67

35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident,
the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt
rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-making process
of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (0 (1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312week entitlement, compensation shall be 662/3% of the employee's average
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per
week, plus S5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a)
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation
rate under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks
of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer
°r its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection
(2), the compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same
Period.
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall ' - all
c
^ses be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings iave
occurred:
209

35-1-67

LABOR -

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under
the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. The commission
shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use in the rehabilitation
and training of the employee.
lb) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of
Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has
fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence,
and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable
of returning to regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has
been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort
under this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body
members, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability is
required in any such instance.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 116, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988,
ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last
amended by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, relating
to permanent total disability, effective July 1,
1988, and enacts the present section.
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend-

ment substituted "$120" for "$110" in the first
sentence of the second paragraph.
Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985,
ch. 160 provided: "This act takes effect upon
approval by the governor, or the day following
the constitutional time limit of Article VII,
^
» ™ * o u t t h e *?ve™T s
f^^f^L*
case
^
/ M a veKtol ftth%dAte o f V e t ° o v e m d e Approved March 18, 198o.
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Arm injuries.
Commencement of benefits.
Determination of character of disability.
Estoppel.
Eye injuries.
Findings.
Law in effect.
Maximum benefits.
Multiple injuries.

210

R490-1-17. Permanent Total Disability
• • • •

C. In evaluating industrial claims in whicl:
the injured worker has qualified for Social
Security disability benefits, the Commission
will determine if a significant cause of the
disability is the claimant's industrial accident
or some other unrelated cause or causes.
Utah Admin. Code R490-1-17(C) (199
(emphasis added).

